SELF-DEFENSE-DuTY

TO RETREAT-RETREAT

ONE'S OWN HOME NOT

FROM THE PORCH OF'

REQUIRED--State v. Bonano, 59 N.J. 515,

284 A.2d 345 (1971).
[T]he house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well
as for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose ....1
Having failed to find some card-playing friends one night, Arturo
Bonano returned home unexpectedly and found his wife absent from
the house, apparently without his permission. She returned shortly from
a christening party, and Bonano physically assaulted her. Bonano's 11year-old stepdaughter, who had witnessed the incident, returned to the
party to tell her uncle Carlos of the occurrence. Carlos went to the
house armed with a kitchen knife and, as Bonano stood in the doorway,
mounted the steps to the porch and apparently made some threatening
remarks upon drawing his knife. Bonano, armed with a revolver that
he had placed in his belt earlier in the evening, fired at Carlos, inflict2
ing a mortal wound.
Bonano was subsequently convicted of second degree murder. His
conviction was affirmed on appeal, and the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification. 4 That court then reversed the conviction, holding,
inter alia, that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to instruct the
jury that defendant had no duty to retreat from the doorway of his
own home when under attack. 5 In reversing, the court stated that there
is no legal duty in New Jersey to retreat indoors from a felonious
attack. 6
Bonano, for the first time, presented squarely to New Jersey's highest court the question: "Must a man retreat when attacked in his own
dwelling house?" 7 The court readily accepted the proposition that a
man need not retreat from his house, but instead may stand his ground
and use deadly force against any person: (1) who is attempting to commit a felony in the house; (2) who is attempting to enter by force for
the purpose of committing a felony; or (3) who is attempting to enter
by force for the purpose of inflicting grievous bodily harm on a resident.8
In promulgating this rule the court did not base its reasoning on the
1 Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1604).
2 State v. Bonano, 59 N.J. 515, 517, 284 A.2d 345, 346 (1971).
3 113 N.J. Super. 210, 273 A.2d 392 (App. Div. 1971).

4 58 N.J. 97, 275 A.2d 153 (1971).
5 59 N.J. at 521, 284 A.2d at 348.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 519, 284 A.2d at 347.
8 Id.
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traditional concept of the "curtilage" of a man's home, heretofore used
to delimit the area in which a person need not retreat. Instead, "curtilage" was discarded as an antiquated term, the present meaning of
which could not be precisely definedY In its place the court suggested
that the following rule be adopted to define the area within which a
person had the right to stand his ground:
Might not the better rule be that a duty to retreat should exist
except as to the dwelling house itself, defined . . . to include a

porch or other similar appurtenance? 10

This rule, which would limit the privileged area to the actual
dwelling house, is to be contrasted with the intimation in the recent
case of State v. Provoid" that a person need not retreat from a stranger
whenever he is within the curtilage of his home. 12 The court in Bonano
has rejected this dictum and thereby has restricted a person's right to
stand his ground and to use deadly force in repelling an assault.
The retreat rule, in those jurisdictions in which it is accepted, is
a prerequisite to establishing excusable homicide through self-defense. 13
It should be noted that originally self-defense was not recognized as a
valid defense to homicide at early common law. 14 After the legal ac9 Id. at 520, 284 A.2d at 347-48. Curtilage has been defined elsewhere as
the space of ground adjoining the dwelling house, used in connection therewith
in the conduct of family affairs and for carrying on domestic purposes. It need
not necessarily be separated from other lands by a fence, nor does the intersection of a divisional fence necessarily affect the relation of a building thus
separated from it ....
Holland v. State, 11 Ala. App. 164, 166-67, 65 So. 920, 920 (1914).
10 59 N.J. at 520, 284 A.2d at 348.
11 110 N.J. Super. 547, 266 A.2d 307 (App. Div. 1970).
12 Id. at 554, 266 A.2d at 311.
13 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw § 616, at 832 (12th ed. 1932).
14 Pollock and Maitland noted that:
The man who commits homicide by misadventure or in self-defence deserves but
needs a pardon.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLIsH LAW 479 (2d ed. 1898).
A detailed history of the development of self-defense and retreat is given in
Beale, Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARv. L. REv. 567 (1903). He summarized the
history of the law of self-defense to the middle of the eighteenth century:
Self-defense merely was no excuse, but ground for pardon; but it was an excuse
in equity, and the equitable defense was at last accepted at law. Killing in due
execution of law was justifiable. This meant at first killing under warrant or by
custom; later private persons were permitted to execute the law upon felons in
a few cases....
Killing for which justification was allowed must be necessary; that is, it was
permitted only when to refrain from killing the malefactor would necessarily
leave him free to commit his crime and escape.
Id. at 572-73 (footnotes omitted).
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knowledgment of the doctrine of self-defense, the retreat rule developed, requiring that:
The party assaulted must therefore flee as far as he conveniently
can, either by reason of some wall, ditch, or other impediment; or
as far as the fierceness of the assault will permit him .... 15
This doctrine was largely accepted by the American colonies, but with
westward expansion a dichotomy began to appear. Some states continued to require a person exposed to an unprovoked, deadly assault
to retreat, while others, chiefly the western and southern states, did
not require retreat. 16
Today, all states recognize the plea of self-defense as a defense to
the charge of felonious homicide, and New Jersey is no exception.1
However, the elements of self-defense have largely developed through
decisional law. Currently, a greater number of states recognize no duty
to retreat in the face of an unprovoked deadly attack,'8 while a minority
15

4 W.

BLACKSTONE,

COMMENTARIES 185 (5th ed. 1769) (footnote omitted).

16 Beale, supra note 14, at 576-77.

§ 2A:113-6 (1969) provides:
Any person who kills another by misadventure, or in his or her own defense,
or in the defense of his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, sister,
master, mistress or servant, or who kills any person attempting to commit arson,
burglary, kidnapping, murder, rape, robbery or sodomy, is guiltless and shall
be totally acquitted and discharged.
18 State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963) (defendant was under no duty
to retreat from place he had a lawful right to be, even if he could safely do so); People
v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 153 P.2d 21 (1944) (one who is without fault and is feloniously
attacked need not retreat, but may stand his ground and slay his assailant); Enyart v.
People, 67 Colo. 434, 180 P. 722 (1919) (jury was erroneously instructed that one in
lawful place and not at fault was obliged to flee unless it appeared too dangerous to
retreat); People v. Bush, 414 111. 441, 111 N.E.2d 326 (1953) (one unlawfully assaulted and
put in apparent danger of great bodily harm has no duty to retreat, but may stand his
ground and may be justified in killing his assailant if necessary); State v. Hatch, 57 Kan.
420, 46 P. 708 (1896) (jury was erroneously instructed that a person unlawfully attacked
must "retreat to the wall" before he is justified in killing his assailant); State v. Merk,
53 Mont. 454, 164 P. 655 (1917) (defendant was justified in slaying his assailant, though
not in actual peril, if a reasonable man would have acted in like manner); State v.
Grimmett, 33 Nev. 531, 112 P. 273 (1910) (one who is without fault and is attacked by
another may, if necessary, stand his ground and kill his adversary); State v. Washington,
234 N.C. 531, 67 S.E.2d 498 (1951) (one subject to a murderous assault may, if necessary,
stand his ground and kill his assailant); Graham v. State, 98 Ohio St. 77, 120 N.E. 232
(1918) (one not at fault and in the lawful pursuit of his business need not retreat from
a sudden, violent assault); State v. Rader, 94 Ore. 432, 186 P. 79 (1919) (it was error not
to charge the jury that where a person is where he has a right to be, he need not retreat
under a felonious assault); State v. Jaukkuri, 41 S.D. 4, 168 N.W. 1047 (1918) (it was error
to charge the jury that defendant must retreat if a safe avenue of escape were available);
Stoneham v. Commonwealth, 86 Va. 523, 10 S.E. 238 (1889) (it was error not to charge
the jury that one under felonious attack need not retreat); State v. Hiatt, 187 Wash. 226,
60 P.2d 71 (1936) (it was error to charge the jury that defendant had a duty to retreat
17 N.J. STAT. ANN.
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of states recognize a duty to retreat in such circumstances. 19 New Jersey
20
falls into the latter category.
In New Jersey, the plea of self-defense to a charge of felonious
homicide was recognized as early as 1790. In State v. Wells, 21 the court
stated that
no man is justified or excusable in taking away the life of another,
unless the necessity for so doing is apparent as the only means of
avoiding his own destruction or some very great injury .... 22
Subsequent cases in New Jersey have refined the elements of selfdefense by holding that there must be a reasonable apprehension of real
or apparent danger threatening the defendant. 23 Furthermore, the
necessity for self-defense cannot be initiated by the defendant's own
under unprovoked attack); State v. Zannino, 129 W. Va. 775, 41 S.E.2d 641 (1947) (one
not an original aggressor is not required to retreat from an unjustified threatened assault);
Miller v. State, 139 Wis. 57, 119 N.W. 850 (1909) (one who, while in a place where he had
a right to be, was subjected to an unprovoked assault may stand his ground).
19 King v. State, 233 Ala. 198, 171 So. 254 (1936) (one must retreat rather than take
life of adversary no matter how great the peril, so long as there is a safe mode of retreat);
Quillen v. State, 49 Del. 114, 110 A.2d 445, petition for reargument denied, 49 Del. 163,
112 A.2d 848 (1955) (no error to charge jury that even if deceased first attacked defendant,
he was under duty to retreat if he safely could do so); Scholl v. State, 94 Fla. 1138, 115
So. 43 (1927) (one must use all reasonable means, consistent with own safety, to avoid
assault and to avert necessity of taking human life); State v. Rheams, 34 Minn. 18, 24
N.W. 302 (1885) (homicide is not justifiable as an act of self-defense if it is apparent
that the person assaulted may avoid the threatened injury by retreating); State v. Jackson,
227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955) (it was error not to charge jury that defendant must
avoid taking human life if at all possible, even to the extent of retreating, unless such
retreat would increase danger to defendant).
20 E.g., State v. Provoid, 110 N.J. Super. 547, 266 A.2d 307 (App. Div. 1970) (generally,
defendant has duty to retreat when attacked, if he can reasonably do so in complete
safety); State v. Di Maria, 88 N.J.L. 416, 97 A. 248 (Sup. Ct. 1916), aff'd mem., 90 N.J.L.
341, 100 A. 1071 (Ct. Err. & App. 1917) (one is not justified in standing his ground if he
can avoid the danger by retreating). For a review of the retreat rule in New Jersey, see
Comment, The New Jersey Duty to Retreat, 16 RuTGErtS L. REv. 608 (1962).
21 1 N.J.L. 424 (Sup. Ct. 1790).
22 Id. at 430.
23 State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 247 A.2d 669 (1968) (justification for killing in self-defense
depends on jury's determination of what they think a reasonable man would have done
in same circumstances); State v. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. 300, 164 A.2d 481 (1960) (killing in
self-defense is justified when the act of killing is necessary or reasonably appears to be
necessary in order to preserve one's own life or to protect oneself from serious bodily
harm; test is whether defendant reasonably believes it necessary to kill); State v. Mellillo,
77 N.J.L. 505, 71 A. 671 (Ct. Err. & App. 1908) (one may protect oneself, even to the extent
of taking life, if it is, or reasonably appears to be, necessary to preserve own life, or protect oneself from serious bodily harm); State v. Bonofiglio, 67 N.J.L. 239, 52 A. 712, 54 A.
99 (Ct. Err. & App. 1901) (justifiable homicide to take life of adversary to preserve own
life or protect oneself from serious bodily harm) (see note 51 infra); State v. Centalonza, 18
N.J. Super. 154, 86 A.2d 780 (App. Div. 1952) (justifiable homicide if it seems that the
threat to one's own life could not be avoided except by taking the life of assailant).
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aggressive acts. 24 If he does provoke a conflict, he must first abandon his
25
action before he can claim a right to self-defense.
The retreat rule in New Jersey became settled law in State v. Di
Maria,26 where the trial court's instruction to the jury that the defendant must retreat if he could safely do so was upheld.2

7

The court based

its holding on Wells:
Although the obligation to retreat, when this can be done safely,
is not expressly declared in the opinion in the Wells case, it is,
we think, necessarily implied in the declaration that a homicide is
not justifiable or excusable unless the necessity for taking life is apparent as the only means by which the2 sslayer can avoid his own
destruction or some great bodily injury.
in so holding, the court rejected the rationale underlying the no29
retreat rule upon which defendant relied.
The basic philosophy adopted by the no-retreat jurisdictions is
that an innocent person should not be forced to flee from a place where
24 State v. Agnesi, 92 N.J.L. 53, 104 A. 299 (Sup. Ct. 1918), afJ'd mem., 92 N.J.L. 638,
106 A. 893, 108 A. 115 (Ct. Err. & App. 1919).
25 State v. Blair, 2 N.J.L.J. 346 (Essex 0. & T. 1879).
26 88 N.J.L. 416, 97 A. 248'(1916). But see State v. Blair, 2 N.J.L.J. at 348-49, which
contains a statement of the duty to retreat but which case has never been subsequently
cited in New Jersey as controlling; the court charged the jury:
In determining whether. the deceased made all reasonable efforts to avoid
the necessity for taking life, you are to consider his situation at the time the
fatal wound was given. In some cases an accused is bound to retreat, in others
he is not. If he can retreat with safety, and avoid the necessity of taking the life
of his adversary, he is bound to adopt that course. But where his situation is so
perilous as not to allow retreat without manifest danger to life or grievous
bodily harm, he is under no obligation to:fly, but may, if need be, kill his adversary. He is not bound to wait until his adversary has effected his destruction
before he acts.
27 The trial court had instructed the jury that
if the defendant had a reasonable apprehension that his own life was in danger
or that he was in danger of serious bodily injury, he had a right to defend himself even to the extent of taking the life of the decedent; but that the law required that he should retreat if he could safely do so, and that if he could have
done so with reasonable safety, and yet did not retreat, but instead fired at the
deceased with the intention of killing him, or inflicting upon him a mortal
wound, the homicide was neither excusable nor justifiable.
88 N.J.L. at 416-17, 97 A. at 249.
28 Id. at 418, 97 A. at 249.
29 The defendant contended that
where a man who is in a place where he has a right to be is attacked by another,
he need not retreat, although a way to escape injury by doing so is open to him,
but is entitled to stand his ground and kill his adversary in order to prevent his
adversary from killing him or doing him serious bodily harm.
Id. at 417, 97 A. at 249. The defendant's contention
was a clear statement of the rule
See note 30 infIra.
adopted by the no-retreat jurisdictions.
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he has a right to be.30 Unlike the retreat jurisdictions, the no-retreat

jurisdictions examine the right of the slayer to be there in order to
determine his right to stand his ground. If the slayer is the aggressor in
a murderous assault, he is not justified in killing. Rather, he must first
totally withdraw from the conflict in order to successfully assert the
privilege of self-defense. 3 ' Likewise, a party involved in non-deadly
mutual combat, or "chance-medley,"3 2 must also "retreat to the wall"
33
to regain the right of self-defense.
Of more concern, however, is the position of the innocent victim
of an assault, Bonano in the instant case. In a no-retreat jurisdiction,
such a person, if without fault and exposed to a felonious attack, need
not retreat even if a safe avenue of retreat is available to him. Not only
may he stand his ground, but he may also use any force necessary to
overcome his assailant, even if it means slaying him.34 However, a nonfelonious assault does not justify homicide, 35 and even a trespasser has
a right to a plea of self-defense if he has first used any reasonable means
of retreat.36
30 A justification for a no-retreat rule was given in State v. Bartlett, 170 Mo. 658,
71 S.W. 148 (1902):
[T]he right to go where one will, without let or hindrance, despite of threats made,
necessarily implies the right to stay where one will, without let or hindrance.
These remarks are controlled by the thought of a lawful right to be in the
particular locality to which he goes or in which he stays. It is true, human life is
sacred, but so is human liberty. One is as dear in the eye of the law as the other,
and neither is to give way and surrender its legal status in order that the other
may exclusively exist ....

.
We hold it a necessary self-defense to resist, resent, and prevent . . .
humiliating indignity . . . and that, if nature has not provided the means for
such resistance, art may; in short, a weapon may be used to effect the unavoidable
necessity.
Id. at 668-71, 71 S.W. 151-52.
31 People v. Holt, 25 Cal. 2d 59, 153 P.2d 21 (1944); State. v. Robison, 54 Nev. 56, 6
P.2d 433 (1931); State v. Flory, 40 Wyo. 184, 276 P. 458 (1929).
32 "Chance-medley" has been defined as "an ordinary fist fight, or other non-deadly
encounter." R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAw 998 (2d ed. 1969).
33 See People v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 42 P. 307 (1895); Clark v. Commonwealth, 90
Va. 360, 18 S.E. 440 (1893).
34 E.g., State v. Jackson, 94 Ariz. 117, 382 P.2d 229 (1963); Macias v. State, 36 Ariz. 140,
283 P. 711 (1929); People v. Collins, 189 Cal. App. 2d 575, 11 Cal. Rptr. 504 (1961); People
v. Zuckerman, 56 Cal. App. 2d 366, 132 P.2d 545 (1942); Bange v. State, 237 Ind. 422, 146
N.E.2d 811 (1958); Flick v. State, 207 Ind. 473, 193 N.E. 603 (1935); Gibson v. Commonwealth, 237 Ky. 33, 34 S.W.2d 936 (1931); Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186 (1876); Alexander
v. State, 70 S.W. 748 (Tex. Crim. Ct. App. 1902). See also cases dted note 18 supra.
35 State v. Spear, 178 Wash. 57, 33 P.2d 905 (1934).
36 People v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, 42 P. 307 (1895); see Thompson v. State, 462 P.2d
299 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1969).
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In a retreat jurisdiction, the basic principle is that even the innocent victim of a murderous assault must retreat, if he can safely do so.7
However, an adjunct to this is the exception that one exposed to a
sudden felonious assault need not retreat if there is no apparently safe
avenue of retreat open to him at the time.38 Such an avenue of escape
must be one that would reasonably be recognized as being safe; an
39
innocent victim is under no duty to increase the peril to himself.
Moreover, it is not necessary that one "retreat to the wall" within
one's own dwelling house. 40 The retreat jurisdictions are split, however,
on the issue of the duty to retreat within the house if the assailant is a
41
member of the household or otherwise has a coequal right to be there.
A guest in the dwelling house of another usually assumes the rights of
the owner or occupant of the house, and need not retreat, unless he is
assaulted by the owner or occupant. 42 Beyond the dwelling house itself,
the retreat jurisdictions are badly split as to what other locations may
87 In State v. Haifa, 246 Iowa 1275, 1289, 71 N.W.2d 35, 43, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914
(1955), the court stated:
.. T]o justify homicide on the ground that it was committed in self-defense,
four elements must be present: (1) the slayer must not be the aggressor in provoking
or continuing the difficulty that resulted in the killing; (2) he must retreat as far
as is reasonable and safe before taking his adversary's life, except in his home or
place of business; (3) he must actually and honestly believe he is in imminent
danger of death, great bodily harm, or some felony, and that it is necessary to
take the life of his assailant to save himself therefrom; and (4) he must have
reasonable grounds for such belief.
A justification for a retreat rule was given in Cooke v. State, 18 Ala. App. 416, 421, 93
So. 86, 90 (1921), cert. denied, 208 Ala. 100, 93 So. 824 (1922):
This doctrine of retreat is sometimes referred to as being cowardly, but not so; it
is based upon the highest consideration of civilization, morals and our holy religion. It is better that one man should flee rather than take human life . . .
if he can do so without apparently increasing his danger to life or limb. It is no
cowardly doctrine.
38 Walker v. State, 223 Ala. 294, 135 So. 438 (1931); State v. Jackson, 156 Iowa 588,
137 N.W. 1034 (1912); State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955).
39 King v. State, 233 Ala. 198, 171 So. 254 (1936); Quillen v. State, 49 Del. 114, 110
A.2d 445 (1955); State v. Gardner, 96 Minn. 318, 104 N.W. 971 (1905).
40 State v. Bissonnette, 83 Conn. 261, 76 A. 288 (1910); Hedges v. State, 172 So. 2d 824
(Fla. 1965); DeVaughn v. State, 232 Md. 447, 194 A.2d 109 (1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
927 (1964); People v. McGrandy, 9 Mich. App. 187, 156 N.W.2d 48 (1967); State v. Jackson,
227 S.C. 271, 87 S.E.2d 681 (1955); State v. Turner, 95 Utah 129, 79 P.2d 46 (1938).
41 Duty to retreat: State v. Grierson, 96 N.H. 36, 69 A.2d 851 (1949); State v. Pontery,
19 N.J. 457, 117 A.2d 473 (1955); Commonwealth v. Commander, 436 Pa. 532, 260 A.2d 773
(1970) (by implication); see also Annot., 26 A.L.R.3d 1296 (1969).
No duty to retreat: Watkins v. State, 197 So. 2d 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); State v.
Leeper, 199 Iowa 432, 200 N.W. 732 (1924); People v. McGrandy, 9 Mich. App. 187, 156
N.W.2d 48 (1967); State v. Grantham, 224 S.C. 41, 77 S.E.2d 291 (1953).
42 Kelley v. State, 226 Ala. 80, 145 So. 816 (1933); Vander Wielen v. State, 251 So. 2d
240 (Ala. Ct. Grim. App.), cert. denied, 251 So. 2d 246 (Ala. Sup, Ct. 1971 State v. Osborne, 200 S.C. 504, 21 S.E.2d 178 (1942).
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be considered as "the wall" for the victim of a felonious assault. Some
jurisdictions extend the line to include the curtilage around the dwelling,43 while other jurisdictions hold that the victim need not retreat
from his place of business. 44 Even a men's club has been held to be
immune from the retreat doctrine. 45 However, the retreat jurisdictions
tend to reject the suggestion that one need not retreat from the public
streets.

46

In New Jersey it is not clear at what point the duty to retreat
ceases and the right to stand one's ground obtains. Bonano holds that
a person need not retreat from his own dwelling when attacked. 47 That
rule is modified, however, where the premises are occupied by both the
assailant and the defender, as in the case of one spouse attacking the
other 48 or one co-tenant attacking another. 49 In such cases, New Jersey

imposes a positive duty to retreat. 50 On the other hand, one need not
retreat when confronted by a robber, and the defense of self-defense
may be raised for killing the robber. 51 Finally, in contrast to many of
the other retreat jurisdictions, it may be inferred that there is a duty to
retreat when confronted by an aggressor in one's place of business. 52
The court in Bonano has redefined the exception to the retreat
rule, limiting it to those cases where the defendant is actually in his
dwelling house, or an appurtenance thereto. Apparently excluded from
43 Bryant v. State, 252 Ala. 153, 39 So. 2d 657 (1949) (no duty to retreat where person
is "in his dwelling house, office, or place of business, or within the curtilage thereof");
State v. Hewitt, 205 S.C. 207, 31 S.E.2d 257 (1944) (one attacked "on his own premises"
need not retreat); see State v. Provoid, 110 N.J. Super. 547, 266 A.2d 307 (App. Div. 1970):
The majority of jurisdictions in this country have concluded that the privilege
of self-defense without retreat extends to anywhere within the "curtilage" of a
man's home.
Id. at 554, 266 A.2d at 310.
44 Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970); State v. Sipes, 202
Iowa 173, 209 N.W. 458 (1926). See Bryant v. State, 252 Ala. 153, 39 So. 2d 657 (1949); State
v. Feltovic, 110 Conn. 303, 147 A. 801 (1929); State v. Davis, 214 S.C. 34, 51 S.E.2d 86 (1948);
State v. Turner, 95 Utah 129, 79 P.2d 46 (1938). See generally Annot., 47 A.L.R. 418 (1927).
45 State v. Marlowe, 120 S.C. 205, 112 S.E. 921 (1922).
46 See Madison v. State, 196 Ala. 590, 71 So. 706 (1916); State v. Marish, 198 Iowa 602,
200 N.W. 5 (1924); State v. Provoid, 110 N.J. Super. 547, 266 A.2d 307 (App. Div. 1970).
Also rejected is the contention that a person need not retreat when he is in his own automobile on the public roads: Clark v. State, 216 Ala. 7, 111 So. 227 (1927); State v. McGee,
185 S.C. 184, 193 S.E. 303 (1937).
47 59 N.J. at 519-20, 284 A.2d at 347.
48 State v. Pontery, 19 N.J. 457, 117 A.2d 473 (1955).
49 State v. Provoid, 110 N.J. Super. 547, 554, 266 A.2d 307, 311 (App. Div. 1970).
50 Id.
51 State v. Bonofiglio, 67 N.J.L. 239, 52 A. 712, 54 A. 99 (Ct. Err. & App. 1902); cf. State
v. Fair, 45 N.J. 77, 92, 211 A.2d 359, 367 (1965), wherein the court qualifies Bonofiglio,
stating that the right to use deadly force is not absolute.
52 State v. Bess, 53 N.J. 10, 247 A.2d 669 (1968).
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any exceptions to the New Jersey retreat rule would be a sidewalk
leading to the porch, a driveway on the premises, or any buildings not
physically attached to the house. This is at variance with the present
trend in many retreat jurisdictions which have expanded the excep53
tions to the retreat rule to include both the curtilage and the dwelling.
There is no question that the lower court in Bonano exceeded its
discretion by refusing to grant defendant's proffered instruction,
thereby erroneously implying that defendant must retreat from his
doorway into the house. 54 Apparently, no state having a retreat rule
requires that degree of retreat in order for the defendant to qualify for
a plea of self-defense. 55 Accordingly, it is clear that the supreme court
reached a just decision in the instant case. However, rather than simply
reversing the lower court on the erroneous impression conveyed to the
jury, the supreme court chose to adopt the limitation of the dwelling
house in place of the curtilage. In so doing it has narrowed to a considerable extent the area within which a defendant has no duty to
retreat if feloniously attacked.5 6
58 Cases cited note 43 supra; see also R. PERKINS, supra note 32, at 1012.
54 59 N.J. at 521, 284 A.2d at 348. Following summation by the assistant prosecutor,
in which he suggested that defendant could have retreated into the house in order to avoid
the impending conflict, defense counsel requested the trial judge to instruct the jury "that
a man doesn't have to run from his own home."
55 See cases cited note 40 supra.
56 Accord, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY CRIMINAL LAW REvIsION

THE NEW JERSEY PENAL CODE, VOL. I: REPORT AND PENAL CODE

COMMISSION,

§ 2C:3-4, at 26-27 (Oct.

1971), which proposes to restrict the privilege of no-retreat to the dwelling-house only:
a. Use of Force Justifiable for Protection of the Person. Subject to the provisions of this Section and of Section 2C:3-9, the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force
by such other person on the present occasion.
b. Limitations on Justifying Necessity for Use of Force.
(2) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this Section unless the
actor believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death or serious bodily harm; nor is it justifiable if:
(a) the actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily harm, provoked the use of force against himself in the same encounter; or
(b) the actor knows that he can avoid the necessity of using such force with
complete safety by retreating or by surrendering possession of a thing to a person
asserting a claim of right thereto or by complying with a demand that he abstain
from any action which he has no duty to take, except that:
(i) the actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless he was the initial agressor or is assailed in his dwelling by another person whose dwelling the
actor knows it to be ....
For the purposes of Chapter 3, "dwelling" is defined as:
... any building or structure, though movable or temporary, or a portion thereof,
which is for the time being the actor's home or place of lodging.
Id., § 2C:3-11(c), at 34.
In commenting on the Code, the Commission notes that the Code expresses the law
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The rejection of the concept of "curtilage" was premised on the
dire consequences that might result if "curtilage" included premises
and boundary lines that are disputed and later proven to be faulty. The
inquiry posed by the court was: "Is the justification for slaying to rest
upon the resolution of a title issue?" 57 The court's dislike for using the
ancient and imprecise property concept of "curtilage" in justifying
homicide is well taken. But any attempt to draw the boundary line elsewhere would result in the same impreciseness.
At this point, the retreat rule, based on the notion that a civilized
5
person would attempt to retreat when confronted with deadly force,
might well be questioned. At least one writer has suggested that the
states adopting the retreat rule have done so erroneously, and that the
states adhering to the no-retreat rule are following the rule originally
set forth in England. 59 Since the reason for the rule is to prevent the
unnecessary taking of life when an alternative exists, 60 the fact that a
particular state adheres or does not adhere to the rule must be made
known to the general public. This presents difficulties in view of the
high mobility of American society, in which nearly 20 percent of the
population relocates annually. 61 If the desired deterrent effect of the
rule is to be realized, a person will have to be made aware of each
state's retreat rule before he enters its borders. Presently, it is questionable if even a minority of the population of any one state knows
whether that state is a retreat or non-retreat jurisdiction.
of New Jersey on retreat when deadly force is about to be used in one's defense. The
Commission also points out that it is
only when the actor "knows" that he may retreat "with complete safety" that he
must. This makes the retreat rule of the Code a relatively limited one.
A person is not required to retreat from his dwelling ... unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his dwelling by another person whose dwelling he
also knows it to be. This is New Jersey law.... The MPC [Model Penal Code]
would not require retreat in one's place of work. We have eliminated this as
an exception to the retreat rule, being of the opinion that places of work should
not be equated with dwellings for this purpose ...
FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW JERSEY LAW REVISION COMMIssION, THE NEW JERSEY PENAL
CODE, VOL. II: COMMENTARY § 2C:3-4(10)(c), at 87 (Oct. 1971).
57 59 N.J. at 520, 284 A.2d at 348.
58 See note 37 supra.
59 R. PERaINS, supra note 32, at 1004, points out that
[i]n this country, while a majority of the courts followed the position which had
been taken in the mother country, a substantial minority misunderstood the English cases on self-defense and thought they applied to the innocent victim of a
murderous attack.
60 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 15, at 185.
61 In 1968-1969, 18.3 percent (35.9 million) moved, with 3.4 percent (6.6 million)
moving from one state to another. STATISTcAL ABsTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 33 (1970).
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Also, the American traditions of vigilantism, the competitive spirit,
and especially the idea that it is cowardly to retreat, which are continually broadcast and reinforced by the mass media, can only lead to
a conditioned response on the part of a victim meeting, "at the moment
of truth," a felonious assault. 2 In view of this conditioning, it appears
both unrealistic and unreasonable to continue to require a duty to retreat by one exposed to a felonious attack. The doctrine followed by
the majority of the states would seem to be a better choice; that is,
the innocent victim of a murderous assault who is himself free
from fault, and reasonably believes he must use deadly force
to save himself from death or great bodily harm, if he does not
retreat, [is] privileged to stand his ground and resort to deadly
force there merely because he is where he has a right to be ....

63

David W. Collins
62 Is violence in America "as American as cherry pie"? In answer to that question,
consider that some of the
sources of violence in our national life are inheritances of our own past: a celebration of violence in good causes by our revolutionary progenitors, frontiersmen,
and vigilantes; immigrant expectations of an earthly paradise only partly fulfilled;
the unresolved tensions of rapid and unregulated urban and industrial growth.

REPORT TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, VIO-

LENCE IN AMmucA, at xiii (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969). Several violent aspects of

American society are treated in the report.
In considering the frontier tradition, it is noted that:
The frontier placed a premium on independent action and individual reliance. The whole history of the American frontier is a narrative of taking what
there was to be taken....
We revere these heroes because they were men of vast imagination and daring.
We also have inherited their blindness and their excesses.
J. Frantz, The Frontier Tradition: An Invitation To Violence, in Report supra, at 119, 120.
The question of the impact of the mass media, "with its high component of violence,"
on the conditioning and acceptance of violence in social relations is raised by M. Janowitz,
Patterns of Collective Racial Violence, in Report supra, at 393, 415.
Examples of other source material in this area include: A. ARNOLD, VIOLENCE AND YOUR
CHILD (1969); VIOLENCE IN Tm SmTRErs (S. Endleman ed. 1968).
63 R. PERM.NS, supra note 32, at 1004, wherein the author postulated this "rule" as
the "basic question" to be answered.

